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Paying the Wrong Debt 
Roger Bernhardt23 
If your client is putting new money into a venture to pay off an old lien, he or she probably 
expects to take over the same position occupied by the old lien. There are a number of ways to 
do that. 
The safest way is to buy the old paper, i.e., take an assignment of the mortgage and thereby 
acquire all of the rights and priorities of the former lender. See Strike v Trans-West Discount 
Corp. (1979) 92 CA3d 735, 155 CR 132. This may be impractic l, however, if the old lender is 
unwilling to sell, or if the terms of the old loan don’t fit the new deal and other parties won’t go 
along with the changes your client and the debtor have worked out. See Flack v Boland (1938) 
11 C2d 103, 77 P2d 1090. If the existing lienors are ccommodating, another alternative is to 
have them execute subordination agreements putting your client in the proper position. Finally, if 
your client has done all this without you and didn’t get the proper consents, you can hope that 
equitable subrogation may come to the rescue. 
Equitable subrogation is a doctrine that, in certain circumstances, permits a creditor to pay off 
a debt that someone else owes and then step into the shoes of the original creditor and assert that 
creditor’s rights against the debtor and that creditor’s priority as against other creditors. Under 
Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v Feldsher (1996) 42 CA4th 41, 49 CR2d 542, however, those 
circumstances have to be very right for the doctrine to apply. One little glitch and your client 
may instead end up having bestowed a “gift” on the debtor or junior lienholders. 
Feldsher sold a business to Razzano and took as payment a $750,000 note secured by a fourth 
deed of trust on Razzano’s property, behind liens of $265,000, $210,000, and $50,000 (in that 
order). Feldsher agreed that he would subordinate his deed of trust to a new first, not to exceed 
$250,000. Several months later, Greenberg, an experi nc d, hard-money lender, lent Razzano 
$300,000, intending that $210,000 of it would pay off the old second and put him in that 
position, on the belief that Feldsher was subordinating his deed of trust to Greenberg’s new loan. 
The title company issued a policy to Greenberg insur g his $210,000 deed of trust in second 
position, senior to Feldsher, and his $90,000 deed of trust in fifth position, junior to Feldsher. 
Feldsher, however, had agreed to subordinate only t a new first, not to a second, so Greenberg’s 
entire $300,000 was fifth. When Razzano defaulted on his note to Feldsher, Feldsher foreclosed, 
wiping out Greenberg’s entire $300,000. As a result, Lawyer’s Title paid Greenberg for his 
interest in the purported second and then sued to establish an equitable lien on the property (now 
held by Feldsher) as Greenberg’s assignee. 
Because his money had paid off a lien prior to Feldsher’s, Greenberg seemed to have a pretty 
good claim to equitable subrogation: Feldsher had $210,000 more equity than he would have had 
without Greenberg’s money. But the court of appeal rejected the claim for technical and 
equitable reasons, both of which are rather counter-i uitive and should cause attorneys to be 
cautious. 
The technical reason Greenberg lost was that he had actual knowledge of Feldsher’s lien when 
he made his loan. According to the court, this knowledge, coupled with his experience as a 
lender, made him guilty of “culpable and inexcusable neglect” for not assuring himself that 
Feldsher had signed a subordination agreement. It is true that some cases had stated that a new 
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lender’s actual knowledge of an existing lien could impair equitable subordination rights, but this 
statement was always made in the context of holding that mere constructive notice (i.e., the fact 
that the existing lien was recorded) was not enough to preclude equitable subrogation. See, e.g., 
Darrough v Herbert Kraft Co. Bank (1899) 125 C 272, 57 P 983; Smith v State Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n (1985) 175 CA3d 1092, 223 CR 298 (relied on by therial court). Lack of actual 
knowledge always seemed to be used merely as an extra r ason for reaching that result. After all, 
the junior lienholder profits just as much from having the senior debt paid off by a payor with 
constructive knowledge as it does when the payor has actual knowledge. 
I had thought that the “actual knowledge” exception was intended to exclude cases in which 
the new lender was deliberately trying to keep the existing junior down or manipulate the value 
of the property—i.e., as a sort of antimeddling, antifraud requirement (see, e.g., Stein v Simpson 
(1951) 37 C2d 79, 230 P2d 816)—and that a new lender who mistakenly believes that a prior 
lien was validly subordinated to the new lien is more like the lender who mistakenly believes that 
there is no other interest already of record (i.e., who has only constructive notice of it). The 
court, however, went the other way. It held that Greenberg’s failure to get a proper subordination 
“demonstrates negligence far more culpable than the mere failure to search the records for an 
intervening lien.” 42 CA4th at 52. 
I have trouble with that distinction (and with even characterizing as culpable negligence the 
failure to take steps necessary to protect only yourself), so from now on I will admonish a lender 
never to assume that it can safely pay off an existing loan and put its new loan in the same 
position if it has any knowledge of a junior interest, even if the funds are used entirely to cancel 
the old debt and the transaction seems to make the old junior better off. 
I say this because the court, while recognizing that its result seemed to create a windfall for 
Feldsher, justified the result by claiming that it was necessary to avoid prejudice to Feldsher. It is 
very odd prejudice, however. The old $210,000 second and the $50,000 third were due soon after 
the sale from Feldsher to Razzano. “To revive the $210,000 second trust deed which was paid off 
with funds provided by the Greenberg loan would be contrary to the Feldshers’ agreement for the 
sale of their company and deprive the Feldshers of the benefit of their bargain.” 42 CA4th at 53. 
If refinancing a maturing loan is prejudicial to a junior lender, it seems to me that anything can 
be called prejudicial. The juniors I know generally dread rather than welcome the maturing of a 
senior loan. And how likely is it that the existing second and third loans would have been 
“retired as scheduled” in light of the fact that Razz no found it necessary to borrow money to 
refinance them, and immediately thereafter (so I calcul te, because Feldsher’s trustee sale was 
held four months later) defaulted on the fourth (the Feldsher loan)? 
Equitable subrogation is applied rarely enough as it i . (Last year I tried, unsuccessfully, to 
persuade the American Law Institute to have its new Restatement of Mortgages drop the 
requirement that a junior must pay off a senior loan in full to claim such rights, so that juniors 
who are forced to make installment payments to reinstate defaulted seniors might get some of the 
priority of the senior.) No investor should ever consciously count on protection from the 
doctrine. Equitable subrogation means discretionary subrogation, which too often can mean 
whimsical nonsubrogation. Getting the paperwork right s the only safe course. 
 
